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Abstract—A service chain is a combination of network services
(e.g. network address translation (NAT), a firewall, etc.) that
are interconnected to support an application (e.g. video-on-
demand). Building a service chain requires a set of specialized
hardware devices each of which need to be configured with their
own command syntax. By moving management functions out of
forwarding hardware into controller software, software-defined
networking (SDN) simplifies provisioning and reconfiguration
of service chains. By moving the network functions out of
dedicated hardware devices into software running on standard
x86 servers, network function virtualization (NFV) turns the
deployment of a service chain into a more (cost)-efficient and
flexible process. In an SDN/NFV-based architecture, those service
chains are composed of virtual network functions (VNFs) that
need to be mapped to physical network components. In literature,
several algorithmic approaches exist to do so efficiently and cost-
effectively. However, once mapped, a simple revenue model is
used for pricing the requested substrate resources. This often
leads to a loss of revenue for the infrastructure provider.
In this paper, we propose a more advanced, dynamic pricing
algorithm for pricing the requested substrate resources. The pro-
posed algorithm increases the infrastructure provider’s revenue
based on historic data, current infrastructure utilization levels
and the pricing of competitors. Our experimental evaluation
shows that the proposed algorithm increases the revenue of the
infrastructure provider significantly, independent of the average
network utilization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, building a service chain to support a new application
requires specialized hardware devices (middleboxes). Each
middlebox needs to be configured individually via a vendor-
specific syntax leading to complex configuration, high chance
for error and high operational expenditures. As application
loads vary over the day and often increase over time, building
a service chain means overprovisioning of the devices to
support the maximum level of demand leading to extra capital
expenditures. As service chains are often built to support mul-
tiple applications, data sometimes passes through unnecessary
network devices or servers.
By using SDN and NFV concepts, the effort and time
needed to build a service chain to support a new application
can be reduced. In a SDN/NFV-approach, a service chain
refers to the abstraction used to define high-level services in
a generic way. The service is described as a Service Graph
(SG): a chain of high-level Network Functions (NFs) and pre-
defined parameters.
These SGs need to be mapped to the physical infrastructure.
As such, an embedding algorithm is needed to determine if
the NFs and their connections in the SGs can be mapped to
the physical infrastructure (virtual network embedding, VNE).
In literature, several algorithmic approaches exist to solve the
VNE problem. We refer the interested reader to [1] for a survey
of VNE algorithms. Initial studies on placement of VNFs and
VNF chains in both IP and optical networks are presented in
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] and our own work [8].
There are however other, related challenges that receive
fewer attention. For example, the authors of [9] declared that
finding advanced economic models for VN pricing, instead of
the simple revenue model used in the existing literature, is an
important research topic that needs further attention. In that
field, our work is related to the online pricing literature that
deals with instantaneous demand dynamics and the adjustment
of prices on the spot. Dynamic pricing has become an active
field of the revenue management literature, with successful
realworld applications in industries such as travel, fashion,
etc. [10], [11], [12]. Closely related to our work, revenue
management has also been applied to the field of cloud
computing, [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. For cloud providers,
unlike other fields, revenue not only depends on the (unknown)
number of customers, but also on the (unknown) duration of
usage. As such, not only arrival rates but also service times
are stochastic. In those works however, resources are consid-
ered as interchangeable. When embedding service graphs, the
customer will however typically have a set of requirements
(e.g. delay, location, etc.) for a network of resources. Re-
sources are therefore hardly interchangeable without harming
the expected quality-of-service. To our knowledge, work in
this field is limited. The most related work to ours are [18] in
which the negotiation process in a multi-domain environment
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Fig. 1. Network and Cloud control architectures
is considered and [19] in which an auction based pricing
strategies is used. These approaches are however dependent on
a specific VNE algorithm, do not take into account the pricing
strategy of competitors or they wait for a certain time to be
able to batch a set of requests. To address this challenge, this
paper proposes, a revenue management algorithm that deals
with the problem of selling networks of virtualized, perishable
resources to maximize the expected revenue from a population
of price sensitive customers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the stakeholders and provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the problem. In section III, the proposed algorithm is
introduced. The performance evaluation results are reported
and discussed in section IV. Finally, section V concludes the
paper.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A number of stakeholders are involved in the realization of
an SDN/NFV-driven architecture for service chaining.
Ecosystem roles. On the left side of Figure 1, the most
relevant ecosystem roles are represented. These roles are
accomplished by the actors that actively participate in the
exchange of value. Most actors will perform more than one
role at the same time. For example, traditional ISPs fulfill
the role of infrastructure provider, virtual service infrastructure
provider and service provider.
Users. Users, i.e. end/enterprise users, retail or over-the-top
providers, request and consume a diverse range of services. In
general, users have no strong opinion about how the service
is delivered as long as their quality of experience expectations
are satisfied.
Service providers (SPs). SPs accommodate the service de-
mand from users by offering one or multiple services including
over-the-top services and X-play services (e.g. triple play). The
service provider realizes the offered services on a (virtualized)
infrastructure via the deployment of a SG composed of VNFs.
The decomposition of the SG into NFs is referred to as
service decomposition. By decomposing a SG into elementary
NFs, a number of benefits can be realized. First, re-usable
elementary blocks are developed. Second, new and more
complex services can be realized from these elementary blocks
and third, the detailed implementations of these NFs can be
abstracted. Figure 2 depicts an example service decomposition.
The service graph is decomposed into three NFs (NF1,NF2
and NF3), NF2 is decomposed to NF4 and NF5, etc.
Fig. 2. Example of service decomposition process
These SGs are next handed to a virtual service infrastructure
provider who will try to map the SG on the resources provided
by the infrastructure provider.
Virtual service infrastructure providers (VSIPs). VSIPs de-
liver virtual service infrastructure to SPs, thereby meeting
particular service level requirements by combining physical
network and cloud resources owned by the IP into service
infrastructure meeting particular SLA requirements [20].
A VNE algorithm should determine if the NFs and their
connections in the SGs can be mapped to the infrastructure. To
realize this, two control architectures are used to bring together
the areas: (1) the software-driven1 control of communication
networks, and (2) the control of cloud (service) platforms.
Both control architectures are depicted in the architectural
overview of Figure 1 which is based on [21].
The first (in blue, left) is in charge of controlling the
network of switching and routing equipment, the second (in
orange, right) is in charge of creating and exposing cloud
networks, i.e. a network of reusable computing and storage
servers for the purpose of, e.g., building web services. The
control architecture of both domains follows a roughly similar
3-layered approach.
At the lowest layer, infrastructure resources form the physi-
cal foundation on top of which services are provided. Commu-
nication networks rely on network hardware such as switches
and routers, cloud infrastructures rely on (interconnected)
1In the context of this article we focus on SDN-controlled networks,
although traditional distributed routing protocols could also be considered
as the control layer of communication networks.
computing and storage hardware (servers). These resources
are owned by the infrastructure provider (see below).
A second layer, the control layer, interconnects the compo-
nents of the infrastructure layer via their north-bound interface
(e.g. OpenFlow for network control) in order to provide
control-level services such as topology management or datas-
tore services. Virtualization technology introduces a sublayer
in between the infrastructure layer and the control layer, either
at the device level, enabling one device to be segmented in
multiple logical devices (e.g. in the case of server virtual-
ization using Xen or Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM)
virtualization technology), or at the level of multiple devices
by horizontally segmenting or slicing an entire collection of
devices (e.g. in the case of SDN-networks using FlowVisor).
At the highest layer, components of the application layer
build further on control layer services to program client
applications. A traffic engineering application might be defined
on top of the SDN-control layer, while a Hadoop cluster might
be an application on top of the cloud platform.
The orchestration platform has a complete view on available
networking as well as on computing and storage resources
and is used for services that require a combination of these
resources. The orchestration components are able to make an
informed decision on which infrastructure should be used. The
provisioning process itself can then be further delegated to the
already existing network and cloud control platforms.
Orthogonal to the horizontal layers, management function-
ality might be required to configure any of the components at
the infrastructure, control or application layer for example to
ensure policies or security-related options.
Infrastructure providers (IPs). IPs own and maintain the
physical infrastructure and run the virtualization environments.
By virtualizing the infrastructure, they open up their resources
to remote parties for deploying VNFs. The reusable physical
resources comprise all possible resource options (computing,
storage and networking) and they span the entire service
delivery chain from the end-user gateway and set-top-box over
the access, aggregation and core network up to the cloud.
Negotiation process. The negotiation process considers the
interaction between the SPs, VSIPs and the IPs. Their main
objective is to maximize their own profit. Over time SPs send
service request (Serv. Req.) to the VSIPs who try to embed
the SG on the virtualized substrate resources of an IP.
Since provisioning of the SGs may be possible by multiple
IPs, the VSIPs can use the competition between different IPs
to negotiate the best price for a SG. VSIPs will as such
use cost information (the prices charged by competing IPs)
to cost-optimally solve the VNE problem. A service request
(Serv. Req.) is sent by the VSIP to request for a mapping
of a given service chain to the IPs. The request contains
information about the amount of requested virtual resources
and the duration. After receiving a SR, each IP attempts to
perform a mapping. If the mapping is successful, the IP replies
with a mapping proposal (MP) to the VSIP giving details of
the mapping such as the price. If the mapping fails, the IP
sends a mapping failed (MF) message. After receiving a MP,
the VSIP replies with an accept proposal (AP) to the IP with
the best offer and with a reject proposal (RP) to all other IPs.
The negotiation process is summarized in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Overview of the negotiation process
Objective. Our objective is to maximize the total revenue of
the IP from a population of price sensitive customers (VSIPs).
We therefore propose a revenue management mechanism
based on a dynamic pricing algorithm. This dynamic pricing
algorithm requires a set of inputs. Our assumption is that
the IP records information about its own substrate resources
(e.g. available and total resources, historic data about provided
services per substrate resource) and about the pricing of its
competitors (which can be obtained from public sources). We
do not assume that the IP has information about the used VNE
algorithm by the VSIP, nor about the about the state of the
competitor’s substrate resources.
III. PROPOSED DYNAMIC PRICING ALGORITHM
The goal of the infrastructure provider is to maximize its
profit. One possible way to do so is to increase revenue. The
infrastructure provider generates revenue by selling virtual
resources (which are embedded on the physical infrastructure).
As discussed in the previous section, the customer (VSIP)
favors the IP who is able to map the VNR at the lowest price.
When we assume that n (n ∈ [1, N ]) IPs provide an offer for
virtual network request (VNR) v (v ∈ [1, V ]) at a price Pn,v ,
the users willingness to pay for VNR v (WTPv) is as such
the minimum of the offers of the different IPs (Equation 1)
with Pn,v the price of IP n for virtual network request v.
WTPv = min(P1,v, P2,v, P3,v, . . . , PN,v) (1)
As already mentioned in the previous section, we assume
that the pricing of all other IPs is known for a VNR. The
lowest price of all competitor is given by Equation 1.
Determining Pn,v . Pn,v is typically composed of the units
of substrate resource i (i ∈ [1, I]) demanded by VNR v (Ri,v),
the price charged per unit of the substrate resources i (Pi) and
the duration of the VNR v (Dv).
TABLE I
LIST OF PARAMETERS AND THEIR SYMBOLS
parameter symbol
infrastructure provider (IP) n, n ∈ [1, N ]
virtual network request (VNR) v, v ∈ [1, V ]
substrate resource (SR) i, i ∈ [1, I]
constrained SR c, c ∈ [1, C]
acceptance level of substrate resource i ai
price of IP n for VNR v Pn,v
willingness to pay for VNR v WTPv
price of SR i, static, dynamic Pi, Pi,s, Pi,d
price of VNR v, static,dynamic Pv ,Pv,s,Pv,d
units requested of substrate resource i by VNR v Ri,v
duration of VNR v Dv
expected revenue, at acceptance level a E(Rev),E(Reva)
the revenue per unit of SR i for VNR v RUi,v
the average revenue per unit of substrate resource i
at the current level of acceptance ¯RUi,a
blocking probability of SR i
at the current level of acceptance Pb,i,a
the system ingress load E
the mean arrival rate λ of SR i
at acceptance level a ¯λi,a
the mean service time of SR i s¯i
the number of servers available for
SR i at acceptance level a ci,a
overall acceptance level A
discount rate δ
Pn,v =
n∑
i=1
Ri,v × Pi ×Dv (2)
In static pricing, the parameter Pi of Equation 2 is a constant
over time (Pi,s). In dynamic pricing, Pi evolves over time and
as such the price per substrate resource i will be different per
VNR (Pi,d). The goal of this research is to find an algorithm
to determine Pi,d in order to increase the total revenue of the
infrastructure provider.
We summarize the used parameters in Table I and the
proposed dynamic pricing approach in algorithm 1 and detail
the algorithm below.
Determining Pi,d. The general idea of the algorithm is
to vary the unit price of individual resources (e.g. substrate
nodes or substrate links) based on the utilization level of the
resource. If the utilization level is low (i.e. ample storage
space, computing power or bandwidth available), there will
be no constraint to embed several virtual network requests
as they arrive one after the other. As such Pi,d is set at a
price below that of competitors to attract demand. However,
when the utilization level of a resource is high, that resource
may become constrained. As such, the IP will no longer
be able to embed each VNR (e.g. only 9 out of every 10
VNRs). Therefore, when the utilization level of a substrate
resource is high, that resource is protected and only those
virtual network requests with a relatively high revenue per
requested unit of the constrained substrate resource are priced
attractively (in respect to the competitors prices) while those
VNRs that have a relatively low revenue per requested unit of
the constrained substrate resource are priced at a premium to
compensate for the potential loss when a more valuable virtual
Algorithm 1 Dynamic pricing algorithm
while VNR arrive do
map offer
if offer can be mapped then
gather historic data: WTPv , Dv and Ri,v
for all i = 1 to I do
for all v = 1 to V do
calculate RUi,v via Eq. 5
end for
end for
order historic data in ascending order based on RUi,v
for all i = 1 to I do
for all a = vV with v ∈ [1, V ] do
calculate ¯RUi,a via Eq. 7
calculate ci,a via Eq. 9
calculate Pb,i,a via Eq. 8
calculate E(Reva) via Eq. 6
end for
end for
obtain WTPv via Eq. 1
for all i = 1 to I do
select a corresponding with max E(Reva)
calculate Pi,d via Eq. 4
calculate Pv,d via Eq. 3
if Pv,d > WTPv then
add ai to list of constrained resources
end if
end for
if multiple constrained resources then
apply algorithm 2
end if
for all i = 1 to I do
calculate Pi,d via Eq. 4
calculate Pv,d via Eq. 3
save highest Pv,d to Pv
end for
send offer to broker with price Pv
if offer accepted then
embed VNR
end if
else if VNR cannot be mapped then
reject VNR
end if
end while
network request would arrive which cannot be embedded due
to resource shortage.
Instead of using Equation 2 for determining Pv , the price of
the VNR is determined by multiplication of the dynamic price
of the constrained substrate resource i (Pi,d) with the number
of units requested of the constrained resource by VNR v (Ri,v)
and the total duration of the VNR v (Dv). However, when Pv
is lower than the Pv obtained by applying equation 1, the latter
Pv is used (Equation 3).
Pv = max(Pi,d×Ri,v×Dv, Eq.1×(1−δ)),∀i ∈ {1, I} (3)
In this pricing scheme, Pi,d is dynamic and equal to
RUi,v=(1−a)×V+1. RUi,v=(1−a)×V+1 is the revenue per unit
of substrate resource i for VNR v for the acceptance level a
with the maximum expected revenue (E(rev)). The level of
acceptance refers to the number of VNRs that will be priced
at an attractive price. For example, an acceptance level of 80%
means that 8 out of every 10 VNRs will be priced attractively
in respect to the competitors price while the other 2 will be
priced at a premium (for which, the client will likely choose
for a competitor unless there is no better option). Equation 4
is used to calculate RUi,v=(1−a)×V+1.
Pi,d = RUi,v=(1−a)×V+1 =
WTPv
Dv
Ri,v
(4)
Determining a. To determine the acceptance level a with
the maximum E(rev), a database composed of historic data
of all VNRs that have been mapped on substrate resource
i is maintained. It contains three data fields: (1) the lowest
price offered by all competitors for virtual network request v
(WTPv), (2) the duration of virtual network request v (Dv)
and (3) the units requested of substrate resource i in virtual
network request v (Ri,v). The ratio RUi,v , the revenue per
unit of substrate resource i for VNR v, is first calculated for
each of the entries according to Equation 5.
RUi,v =
WTPv
Dv
Ri,v
(5)
The database is next ordered in ascending order based on
this ratio. Once ordered, the acceptance level a with the
maximum E(rev) can be found based on two factors: (1)
the average revenue per unit of substrate resource i used at
the current level of acceptance ( ¯RUi,a) and (2) the blocking
probability of substrate resource i at the current level of
acceptance (Pb,i,a).
E(Reva) = ¯RUi,a × (1− Pb,i,a)× a (6)
Once E(Reva) is determined for all a, the acceptance level
a that corresponds with the the maximum E(Rev) is chosen
from the ordered list and used in Equation 4.
Determining ¯RUi,a. The ordered database is used to cal-
culate ¯RUi,a. ¯RUi, a is then determined according to Equation
7.
¯RUi,a =
∑V
v=(1−a)×V+1
WTPv
Dv
Ri,v
(V − v + 1) , v ∈ [1, V ], a =
v
V
(7)
Determining Pb,i,a. To calculate Pb,i,a, the virtual network
requests arriving at a substrate resource are modeled as a
M/M/c/K queuing system (Kendall’s notation). This is a
queuing system that needs to satisfy the conditions that arrivals
form a single queue and arrive according to a Poisson process
(M , memoryless), that service times are exponentially dis-
tributed (second M ), that there are c servers which serve from
the front of the queue and a buffer capacity of K (including
those in service). In an M/M/c/K queue only K customers
can queue at any one time (including those in service). Any
further arrivals to the queue are considered lost for service. In
this case, a substrate resource is either able to map a virtual
network request or not. As such, the buffer size K is zero
(c = K, M/M/c/c). The Erlang B formula (also known as
the Erlang loss formula), can be used to calculate the blocking
probability that describes the probability of losses for a group
of identical parallel resources (Equation 8). In Equation 8, ci,a
is the number of servers available for substrate resource i at
acceptance level a and E is the systems ingress load in erlang
which is calculated as the mean arrival rate λ of substrate
resource i at acceptance level a ( ¯λi,a) multiplied by the mean
service time of substrate resource i (s¯i).
Pb,i,a =
Eci,a
ci,a!∑ci,a
j=0
Ej
j!
(8)
¯λi,a is calculated by multiplying the historic arrival rate (the
number of virtual network requests that arrive per time unit)
with the acceptance level a. s¯i is calculated as the mean service
time of all virtual network requests that are mapped and use
substrate resource i. To estimate ci,a, the ordered database
of historic data which is maintained per substrate resource is
used in combination with the units available of the substrate
resource i considered (Ai). ci,a can be calculated via Equation
9.
ci,a = b
∑V
v=(1−a)×V+1
Ai
Dv
(V − v + 1) c, v ∈ [1, V ], a =
v
V
(9)
Once ci,a is known, Pb,i,a can be determined via Equation 8.
Once ¯RUi,a and Pb,i,a are known, E(Reva) can be calculated
via Equation 6, etc.
Multiple constrained resources. When using the algorithm
described above to price a VNR, multiple resources may be
constrained instead of just one. When multiple resources are
constrained, the overall acceptance level A will be lower than
the acceptance level of each individual constrained substrate
resource i (ai). As a result, fewer VNRs will be attracted than
initially hoped. To mitigate that risk, ai is scaled by using
Algorithm 2.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The focus of our evaluations is on quantifying the benefit of
the revenue management algorithm in terms of total revenue.
To ensure a fair comparison we model two identical IPs (i.e.
same network topology and substrate capacity) who compete
against each other. The first IP uses the dynamic pricing
algorithm (Equation 3) while the second uses a static pricing
algorithm (Equation 2).
Algorithm 2 Scale availability
A¯←
∑C
i=1 ai
C
A∗ ←∏Ci=1 ai
while A¯ 6= A∗ do
S = C
√
A¯
A∗
for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ C do
ai = min(1, S × ai)
if ai > 1 then
remove ai from the list of constrained resources
end if
end for
A∗ ←∏Ci=1 ai
end while
A. Simulation setup.
We compare different simulation setups: (1) different inter-
arrival rates ( 1λ ) and (2) different capacity requested per virtual
node and link. The scenarios are summarized in Table II. Each
setup is simulated for 20, 000 VNR arrivals. In the dynamic
pricing algorithm, a discount δ of 5% is given (Equation 3).
TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF THE SIMULATION INPUT PARAMETERS
scenario substrate virtual substrate virtual link 1
λ
node node link
1 100-200 10-20 200-400 16-40 1
2 100-200 10-20 200-400 16-40 2
3 100-200 10-20 200-400 16-40 3
4 100-200 10-20 200-400 16-40 5
5 100-200 25-50 200-400 40-100 1
6 100-200 25-50 200-400 40-100 2
7 100-200 25-50 200-400 40-100 3
8 100-200 25-50 200-400 40-100 5
Physical network. The physical infrastructure is modeled
as an undirected graph. The infrastructure consists of nodes
connected via links. Each node has certain capacity in terms of
computation, memory and/or storage, each link has a certain
capacity in terms of bandwidth and has a certain delay. The
substrate network used in the simulations has 25 nodes and 75
links. The minimum and maximum capacity of each substrate
node and link is given in Table II
Service request. Each service request is represented as a
directed graph to support the dependency between elementary
NFs. The NFs in are represented as nodes connected via
directed links in the graph. Each NF has certain requirements
in terms of computation, memory and/or storage and links
connecting different NFs should meet certain requirement in
terms of maximum allowed delay and bandwidth. The virtual
networks used in the simulation have a maximum of 7 nodes
and 12 links. The minimum and maximum capacity of each
virtual node and link is given in Table II.
Virtual network embedding algorithm. The VNE algo-
rithm is an implementation of a link-based multi-commodity
flow formulation of the one-shot virtual network embedding
[22] in CPLEX 12.6.
Negotiation process. The VNRs are awarded to the IP
according to the negotiation process depicted in Figure 3
(we assume 2 IPs). The result of the negotiation process is
classified in 5 categories: (1) F, the VNR cannot be mapped
to either IP, (2) M1, only the first IP is able to map the request,
(3) M2, only the second IP is able to map the request, (4) P1,
both IPs are able to map and IP 1 has the best offer and (5)
P2, both IPs are able to map and IP 2 has the best offer.
B. Results
We report the embedding results for each of the scenarios
in Table III. As can be expected, when demand for substrate
resources is high, e.g. due to a high interarrival time or/and
VNRs that demand a large share of the substrate resources,
the number of failed mappings is large and vice versa. Also,
the number of VNRs that are won by the first provider
by undercutting the competitor’s price (P1) decrease when
demand is high until both are more or less equal for very high
levels of demand (e.g. simulation 5). This can be understood
as (1) only very few requests can be mapped on the substrate
network of both IPs and (2) the VNRs that receive a discount
from IP 1 will be limited to those VNRs that have a high
payoff per unit of the constrained resource.
TABLE III
EMBEDDING RESULTS FOR EACH SIMULATION SETUP.
simulation M1 M2 P1 P2 F total total
IP1 IP2
1 15% 22% 13% 10% 40% 28% 32%
2 2% 26% 44% 18% 10% 46% 44%
3 0% 17% 68% 13% 2% 68% 30%
4 0% 7% 83% 9% 0% 83% 17%
5 9% 9% 1% 1% 80% 10% 10%
6 13% 17% 8% 4% 59% 21% 20%
7 15% 23% 13% 4% 44% 29% 27%
8 5% 28% 45% 13% 9% 50% 41%
When we focus on the total number of VNRs that each
IP has obtained (its market share) it is clear that when
demand is relatively slow (e.g. simulation 4), the first provider
obtains the highest market share and also the highest total
revenue, average node utilization and link utilization (Figure
4). This is reached by systematically undercutting the price
of its competitors for those VNRs that are considered as
valuable. It is however less obvious that IP1 is able to reach
a higher total revenue than IP2 when its market share is
lower (e.g. simulation 1). To clarify this we need to take into
account the node and link utilization rates. These are higher
even though the market share of the first IP is lower. The
proposed revenue management model is able to obtain this
result by pricing VNRs that have a high revenue per unit of
the constrained substrate resources lower than its competitors
while demanding a premium for those VNRs that have a
low revenue per unit of the constrained substrate resources
(Equation 3). The impact of this decision is further clarified
in Table IV which presents the average revenue per VNR for
each embedding result. By focusing on high value requests,
the IP is able to increase its revenue per VNR. To do so, the
IP needs to use its constrained resources optimally (certain
substrate nodes and links) and at the same time reach a higher
utilization rate for those resources that have a lower demand
(e.g. substrate nodes with ample capacity).
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE REVENUE PER VNR
simulation average average average average
revenue P1 revenue P2 revenue M1 revenue M2
1 93% 50% 100% 92%
2 98% 60% 100% 99%
3 100% 62% 96% 98%
4 100% 62% 98% 99%
5 100% 65% 99% 89%
6 92% 64% 100% 95%
7 97% 70% 100% 97%
8 100% 72% - 72%
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed an overarching SDN/NFV architecture
which can be used to realize SGs of reusable network functions
on a virtualized physical infrastructure owned by an infrastruc-
ture provider (IP). By mapping the most relevant ecosystem
roles to the overarching SDN/NFV architecture, we illustrated
the importance of revenue management models for the IP.
The revenue management model proposed in this paper
has as goal to increase the total revenue of the IP. This
goal is reached by a two-fold strategy. First, when demand
is slow (low utilization), VNRs are attracted by underpricing
competitors (via applying a discount). Second, when demand
is strong, high value VNRs receive an offer that undercuts the
price of competitors while low value VNRs are only embedded
if a premium is paid. The value of a VNR is determined by
those substrate resources that have a low amount of available
capacity (constrained resources). The total value of the VNR
divided by the units requested of the requested constrained
resource determines the value of a VNR. By comparing that
value against historic data, the VNR is classified as low or high
value. The proposed algorithm carefully balances the extra
revenue that can be gained by attracting high value VNRs
versus the potential loss of a low value VNR to reach a higher
total and average revenue for the IP. The algorithm has been
validated via simulations and shows a clear improvement in
terms of total revenue and average revenue per VNR.
In this work, the competitor’s price is considered static over
time. In future work, we will consider scenarios in which the
competitor itself applies more advanced revenue management
models.
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